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Abstract  
Official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed since they rest on the 
assumption that the only element of social spending that reacts automatically to the cycle is 
unemployment compensation. This puts into question many estimates of discretionary fiscal 
policy. In response, we propose a simultaneous estimate of automatic and discretionary fiscal 
policy. This leads us, quite naturally, to a tripartite decomposition of the budget balance 
between revenues, social spending and other spending as a bare minimum. Our headline 
results for a panel of 20 OECD countries in 1981-2003 are .59 automatic stabilization in 
percentage-points of primary surplus balances. All of this stabilization remains following 
discretionary responses during contractions, but arguably only about 3/5 of it remains so in 
expansions while discretionary behavior cancels the rest. We pay a lot of attention to the 
impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the EU members of our sample and to real 
time data. 
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1. Introduction 
Official figures for cyclically adjusted government budget balances rest on the assumption 
that automatic fiscal policy essentially works through taxes and unemployment compensation. 
The major international organizations, including the OECD, the IMF and the EU, and many 
national governments within the OECD proceed on this assumption. In a review article, 
Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) provide a long list of econometric studies that employ the 
resulting official data for cyclically-adjusted budget balances. Yet there is little theoretical 
and empirical support for this approach. Various other components of government spending 
besides unemployment compensation may, in principle, respond automatically to the cycle. 
Workers may retire earlier in recessions and later in expansions. The evidence for the OECD 
indicates that they do. People facing job loss or temporary lay-off during a recession may be 
eligible for invalidity benefits or sick pay as an alternative to unemployment benefits. There 
has been a trend toward greater spending on invalidity benefits in many OECD countries in 
recent decades. Therefore, invalidity benefits and sick pay might now move in sync with 
unemployment compensation over the cycle. There is evidence that invalidity payments do. 
Finally, according to the indications, personal health care varies counter-cyclically or, in other 
words, inversely with the opportunity cost of time, which is higher in expansions than 
recessions.  Consequently, social spending on health care moves in a stabilizing manner over 
the cycle.
1
 In Darby and Melitz (2008), we discussed this reasoning and the evidence at some 
length and we shall confirm our earlier findings below. As a result, official figures for 
cyclically adjusted government deficits should not serve in studying discretionary fiscal 
policy. Unreliable inferences about discretionary policy will follow since the officially 
adjusted figures fail to remove all the automatic responses of the fiscal aggregates. 
Admittedly, not all studies proceed in this way, even when they do not question the usual 
view. Many studies of discretionary fiscal policy apply various filters to construct their own 
cyclically-adjusted budget balances. See, for example, Alesina et al. (2002), Lane (2003), 
Aghion and Marinescu (2007), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) and Alesina and Ardagna 
                                                          
1 This spending refers to payments for insured health services provided to individuals or spending on 
entitlements, not to the wage bill or capital expenditures in a nationalized health sector. The latter are not 
included in the social spending data.  
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(2010). In these cases, the cyclically adjusted balances will reflect all responses of 
government social spending to the cycle and our previous complaint does not hold. The only 
objection we still retain concerns the attempt to construct cyclically adjusted data as a 
preliminary prior to the study of discretionary fiscal policy responses. This two-step 
procedure makes some untested assumptions about independence in the data. Joint estimation 
of automatic and discretionary fiscal policy action over the cycle is better. This then defines 
the primary objective of our study: to study both automatic and discretionary fiscal policy 
jointly. However, this objective leads to another. If automatic and discretionary fiscal policy 
are to be estimated jointly, it becomes difficult to justify dealing with the government surplus 
as a single aggregate, rather than separating out some of its parts. The automatic responses of 
fiscal policy to the cycle differ too widely on the revenue and expenditure sides. Social 
spending might also need to be treated separately rather than lumped together with the rest of 
government spending, or alternatively deducted from revenues after trimming social spending 
down to transfer payments in order to construct net taxes. So the minimum decomposition of 
the government budget therefore becomes a central issue as well. We shall attempt to study 
automatic and discretionary fiscal policy jointly with the minimal decomposition of the 
government budget for a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 1981-2003.  
We are not the first to propose estimating automatic and discretionary fiscal policy jointly: 
Celasun et al. (2007) and Bernoth et al. (2008) do so too.
2
 Both of them simply use a different 
identification rule than ours for distinguishing between automatic and discretionary fiscal 
policy. Celasun et al. suppose that all common effects on primary surpluses across countries 
are automatic while the idiosyncratic national ones are discretionary. Bernoth et al. separate 
                                                          
2There are also many studies of fiscal policy that simply make no distinction between automatic and 
discretionary responses and use unadjusted budget data as the dependent variable (though they may sometimes 
draw inferences about one sort of response or the other based on the results, for example, the source of influence 
on the budget). See for example Arreaza et al (1999) and Balassone and Francese (2004) or Balassone et al. 
(2008).  Celasun et al. (2007) and Bernoth et al. (2008) are simply the only previous studies, to our knowledge, 
that explicitly try to estimate automatic and discretionary fiscal policy simultaneously from the start. In addition, 
Romer and Romer have recently proposed a new approach to discretionary fiscal policy responses to the cycle, 
their so-called narrative approach that, in principle, permits studying this one aspect of discretionary fiscal 
policy independently of automatic fiscal policy. Thus far, they have applied their approach only to tax policy in 
the US (Romer and Romer (2009, 2010)). But the IMF has already extended their approach to government 
spending and a wide international sample of countries (IMF (2010)).  
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automatic and discretionary responses to the cycle based on the differences between real time 
and final data. More precisely they use the differences between real time and final data about 
the output gap to identify discretionary responses while employing the final data to capture 
the automatic responses. We base our identification strategy on the timing of responses to the 
business cycle. By and large, automatic fiscal policy occurs more quickly than discretionary 
fiscal policy. Accordingly, our basic procedure is to try to capture the difference between the 
current calendar year response of different budgetary items to the cycle and the lagged one-
year response. No simple decomposition of the automatic and the discretionary responses 
follows, since some current fiscal responses may be discretionary and some lagged responses 
may be automatic. Indeed, there are grounds to think that some effects of the business cycle 
on revenues and unemployment compensation occur only after the current year based on 
existing legal rules, and this is perhaps especially true for unemployment compensation if, as 
in our case, the relevant definition of the cycle is the OECD one, which rests on the output 
gap rather than the Blanchard (1990) one, which rests on unemployment.  However, only the 
results can tell how serious the ambiguities are. We shall reason, based on the results, that 
there are few ambiguities. A fairly clear distinction between automatic and discretionary 
fiscal policy responses will emerge.  
There is now also an important movement afoot to use real time data to identify discretionary 
fiscal policy responses to the cycle, to which Bernoth et al. belong. Except for them and 
Kalckreuth  and Wolff (2007), the other authors in this movement begin with the official 
figures for cyclically adjusted budget balances. See Forni and Momigiliano (2005), Golinelli 
and Momigliano (2006, 2009), Cimadomo (2007), Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008), and 
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008). Yet it is not clear to us that the real time data is necessarily 
superior to the final data. Observers and officials differ in their perceptions of current output 
gaps, and decision-makers know that current output gap data are subject to large revisions. 
Therefore, discretionary fiscal policy may rest on a broader assessment of the evidence than 
the real time figures published by the OECD for the current output gap provide. As a result, 
the lagged values of the final data that eventually emerge could provide as good or better 
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grounds for analyzing official intentions than the real time data does. This is an open issue, in 
our eyes. A further consideration is that real time data are not available for our entire study 
period but only for a sub-section, since 1993, so its exclusive use would have limited our 
study greatly. We will use the available post-1993 sub-sample to check on our conclusions 
about automatic and discretionary fiscal policy in our full sample.   
Contrary to many studies of fiscal policy, though not all (see Golinelli and Momigliano 
(2009)), we estimate our fiscal reaction function in first differences. One reason is the evident 
non-stationarity of the data in levels. Another is our primary concern with the temporary 
fiscal responses to the cycle.  Many structural factors will affect the budget balance in levels, 
but these structural influences should matter less in first differences, while the cyclical 
influences should remain as important. We also avoid the introduction of the lagged 
dependent variable, which figures in many other works. Apart from the well-known 
objections to this variable in panel estimation based on statistical bias, the variable would 
greatly complicate our distinction between the automatic and discretionary policy responses. 
Several earlier studies of fiscal policy behavior employed a dynamic panel estimator, 
Blundell-Bond. However, ours is an unbalanced panel of only 23 annual observations at most 
for 20 countries; so such estimators are not attractive.
3
 For panels such as ours, we believe a 
simpler version of GMM is superior, namely, an IV-GMM procedure providing standard 
errors that are robust to serial correlation and that make no assumptions about 
heteroskedasticity (see Baum et al. (2003) on this point).  In the end, we also find that simple 
IV estimates with correction for heteroskedasticity yield results that are virtually 
                                                          
3 These studies may have been motivated by a desire to avoid large sample bias in panel estimation resulting 
from the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the error term (see Nickell (1981)) since the studies 
tend to introduce the lagged dependent variable.  It is however important to remember that dynamic panel data 
(DPD) techniques, including Blundell-Bonds system GMM estimator, were designed for panels with many 
cross-sectional units N, whether countries, firms or people. The consistency of the DPD estimators was first 
established under the assumption of a fixed time dimension T but N tending to infinity. More recently, however, 
Bun and Kiviet (2006) examined the performance of a number of dynamic panel techniques in samples where 
both T and N are only moderate or small, as is true in our tests, and reported that in these circumstances "all 
dynamic panel techniques show substantial bias so standard Þrst-order asymptotic theory is of little use in 
ranking the qualities. Furthermore Cameron and Trivedi (2005) warn that the application of Blundell Bond 
style estimators to panels with small N can, in practice, lead to a large loss of efficiency while masking problems 
associated with weak instruments.  This last warning concerns us since we instrument. 
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indistinguishable from IV-GMM estimates.
4
 Since there is therefore only negligible gain in 
efficiency from IV-GMM, simple panel IV results are the ones that we report below. 
Following Galí and Perotti (2002), virtually all studies of fiscal policy behavior tend to 
instrument the output gap in order to avoid simultaneity bias. We do the same. 
As a final introductory note, we may return to the issue of the proper degree of aggregation. It 
is generally recognized that taxes move up with output regardless of cyclical upswings or 
secular growth whereas government consumption and investment may not go up with cyclical 
upswings but only with economic growth. Moreover, some parts of social spending can be 
expected to go down during a boom while going up with secular growth. This is true of 
unemployment compensation, and based on our opening paragraph, might be true as well of 
other parts of social spending. On these grounds, any single-aggregate approach to 
discretionary and automatic fiscal policy cannot be simply taken for granted and could well 
be overly restrictive and possibly misleading.   
The next section will lay out our fundamental econometric model. Following, we shall offer 
separate estimates of automatic stabilization for unemployment compensation and other 
elements of social expenditure. These estimates will proceed from our fundamental approach, 
but they have no purpose other than to underline our opening message of the need to extend 
the analysis of automatic stabilization beyond unemployment compensation to many other 
parts of social spending. Our preferred estimates of automatic stabilization follow in the next 
section, IV, where we consider automatic and discretionary fiscal policy jointly. In that 
section we also treat social expenditures as a separate aggregate. Section V introduces 
asymmetric responses to expansions and recessions over the cycle. The results of this section 
notably qualify those in the preceding section IV. Section VI next considers the effects of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in the EMU. Section VII discusses the 
impact of real time data. Section VIII concludes. 
A summary of the results 
                                                          
4 We carried out both sets of IV estimates with Stata 11, using ivreg2 routines to generate the IV-GMM ones; 
see Baum et al. (2010), and Roodman (2003, 2009).  
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Our baseline estimate of automatic stabilization is .59. Specifically, a one percent increase in 
output relative to potential output raises the net primary surplus by .59 of one percent of 
output. Given our choice of specification in terms of ratios of output, the results imply that 
any contribution of government receipts must hinge on changes in the progressivity of 
taxation over the cycle, for which we find inadequate evidence. Thus, the estimated 
stabilization shows up essentially on the spending side (compare Arreaza et al. (1999)). 
According to our estimate, a one per cent rise in output relative to potential output raises 
government spending on goods and services exclusive of health by .24 of a percentage-point 
of output and raises social expenditures by .35 of a percentage-point of output. However, in 
the following year, discretionary policy offsets the entire automatic response stemming from 
government consumption in an expansion, possibly entirely, whereas no similar offset takes 
place in a contraction. As a result, the .59 automatic stabilization remains standing following 
discretionary action in a contraction whereas as little as .35 may remain in an expansion. In 
addition, though the total stabilization coming from both automatic and discretionary policy 
combined is divided between social spending and other government spending roughly in a 
ratio of 3:2 in a contraction, during an expansion still more of the stabilization and possibly 
all of it comes from social spending (compare Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004)). This 
asymmetry in the response of fiscal policy must induce deficit spending over the cycle, in 
accordance with the widespread thesis of a deficit bias over the cycle (see Roubini and Sachs 
(1989), Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Perotti (1995) von Hagen and Harden (1995), de Haan 
et al (1999) Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), and Velasco (1999)). Our finding also supports 
the frequent view that EU members tend to neutralize automatic stabilization through 
discretionary fiscal policy during expansions (see Buti and Sapir (1998), Fatas and Mihov 
(2003a, b), Balassone and Francese (2004), and Balassone et al (2008)). Note, however, that 
we do not support the extreme conclusion, occasionally found, of a complete neutralization of 
automatic stabilization during expansions.  
To continue with the discussion of the results for stabilization policy, we find no fiscal drag 
resulting from inflation over the cycle. This drag refers to the idea that current inflation 
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automatically leads to net government surpluses on a secular basis, as taxes move up in step 
with inflation  ߌ  or even faster through bracket creep  ߌ  whereas spending does not. 
According to our results, there is indeed a fiscal drag on the spending side as neither 
government social payments nor government consumption keep up with inflation. But there is 
a comparable drag on the revenue side as taxes do not keep up with inflation either. It all 
comes out even in the wash.   
Besides the destabilizing behavior of discretionary fiscal policy during expansions, two other 
discretionary influences of fiscal policy appear. One is a stabilizing response of the net 
primary surplus to government debt. A one-percentage-point rise in debt relative to output 
raises the primary surplus (conservatively) by .022 of one percentage-point of output. This 
accords with much recent work (see Melitz (1997), Bohn (1998), Ballabriga and Martinez-
Mongay (2002), Galí and Perotti (2003), Annett (2006), Mendoza and Ostry (2007), 
Balassone et al. (2008), Candelon et al (2010)).   
The second discretionary influence that we found is the impact of an election year. In line 
with a great deal of earlier research, in an election year, tax revenues tend to fall (see Annett 
(2006), Golinelli and Momigliano (2006), Candelon et al (2010)). If anything, the effects on 
government consumption and social spending are positive but insignificant at conventional 
levels. No other political influence emerges, despite the fact that many other such influences 
appear in the rich literature on the political influences on government deficit spending (for 
references, see Annett (2006), and, for example, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999)). Perhaps 
the failure of these variables to enter is related to our move to first differences which 
eliminates all country-specific fixed effects on levels of government receipts and 
expenditures.  
For similar reasons, which may be magnified by our instrumentation of output gaps, we have 
had no success finding any impact of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP on the fiscal 
behavior of EMU members, even in the 1993-1998 period, when efforts to qualify for entry 
into EMU are widely believed to have reduced fiscal deficits.  
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Finally, our key results survive when we introduce real time data despite the consequent sharp 
reduction in time-span.  We cannot say anything about asymmetry in this case, since 
regardless of final or real time data, the results are too weak for the shorter period. But 
otherwise our estimates of automatic fiscal policy and our conclusions about discretionary 
fiscal policy responses to the cycle are little affected.   
 
II. The test specification 
Preliminaries 
Official estimates of automatic stabilization proceed in levels and provide the number of cents 
of net government surplus resulting from a dollar of output gap (GDP minus potential GDP). 
By contrast, estimates of discretionary fiscal policy responses to the cycle usually proceed in 
ratios. They provide the fraction of a percentage point of net government surplus relative to 
(divided by) output or potential output resulting from a percentage point of output gap relative 
to (divided by) output or potential output. All the studies we cited earlier that construct their 
own cyclically-adjusted data for the net primary surplus proceed in ratios. In the numerous 
instances where the choice is simply to import the official series for cyclically adjusted 
budget balances (which are in levels), the tendency is to divide by output or potential output 
as a separate step prior to turning to the analysis of discretionary fiscal policy (for example, 
Galí and Perotti (2003)).  Since we estimate automatic and discretionary policy 
simultaneously, we must make a choice. Ours is to use the percentage formulation. While this 
changes nothing fundamental, it does dwarf the contribution of receipts to automatic 
stabilization relative to the contribution of spending. Simple as it is, this point deserves major 
attention.   
Take the simple classroom example of proportional taxation and total independence of 
spending from the cycle. If we proceed in levels, taxes respond to the output gap in a 
stabilizing manner and government spending does not. Taxes rise while government spending 
stands still in an expansion. If we proceed in ratios, spending responds to the output gap in a 
stabilizing manner whereas taxes do not. The ratio of government spending to output falls 
while the ratio of government receipts stands still in an expansion. The fundamental truth is 
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that the stabilization depends entirely on the combination of proportional taxation and cyclical 
inertia of spending in both examples. Without both together  and in particular if spending 
automatically followed output over the cycle like taxes  then there would be no automatic 
stabilization regardless of estimate in levels or ratios in the case of a balanced budget and 
with minor qualification otherwise.  
We will therefore attach little significance, if any, to our results about the lack of contribution 
of taxes to automatic stabilization relative to government expenditures. On the other hand, our 
results for the behavior of different sources of government revenue relative to one another 
will deserve emphasis. So will our results about the relative contributions of different 
components of spending relative to one another. This last point, concerning spending, 
deserves particular emphasis. We see reason to expect some automatic counter-cyclical 
movement of social spending in level form and we see no reason to expect any automatic 
counter-cyclical movement of government consumption in level form. Therefore, we expect a 
higher contribution of social spending to automatic stabilization than government 
consumption in level form. But if so, we must also expect the same in ratios or after we divide 
both spending and output gaps by output.  
The test specification  
With these points in mind, our basic estimating equations for the fiscal policy reaction 
functions can be expressed as follows:  
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 (1) 
X refers either to the primary budget surplus or the disaggregated components of the primary 
budget surplus. In case of disaggregation, there are as many equations (1) as components i. 
Subscript j refers to the country and t to time. Įt refers to time fixed effects. Y refers to GDP, 
Y
*
 to potential GDP, S  to inflation (calculated using the GDP deflator), D to total public debt, 
and elec is a dummy variable equal 1 in the year of a national election in country j and zero 
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otherwise. As indicated previously, we expect Ei1 to be positive for the primary surplus and 
for government spending, if only because of automatic effects, but we are agnostic about it for 
revenues and we are agnostic about Ei2 in general. The reason for using the primary budget 
surplus rather than the observed budget surplus as the dependent variable (either as a single 
aggregate or as the sum of the relevant parts) is our interest in Ei4, that is, the response of the 
budget to the previous years debt to GDP ratio. Given this dependent variable, Bohn (1998, 
2005) has shown that if the equation for the primary surplus is properly specified or contains 
all the proper explanatory variables on the right hand side, a positive value of E4, however 
low, is a sufficient condition (not a necessary one) for the solvency of the government. We 
experimented with a number of other political and economic variables besides elec that move 
over time, including openness, but the dummy variable for the years of a national election, 
elec, is the only one that we retain. As we noted earlier, many studies have provided strong 
political reasons to expect Ei5 to be negative (in its effect on the primary surplus). Earlier 
empirical work would also lead one to expect negative values for this coefficient as well as 
positive ones for Ei4 (in their respective effects on the primary surplus) for OECD countries. 
We have already explained our decision to exclude the lagged dependent variable from the 
regressions, both for econometric reasons and because of our intended interpretation of Ei1 
and Ei2.5  In addition, as a result of our decision to proceed in first differences, there is no 
need for country-specific influences. Such influences would merely use up degrees of 
freedom but otherwise have no effect, at least in principle (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 
pp. 781ff.) and Roodman (2009)).
6
  
We initially instrumented all the first four variables in equations (1) in the estimates. 
However, test statistics consistently failed to reject the weak exogeneity of the inflation 
variable. Thus, in the end, we only retained instruments for the two output gap variables and 
the debt/GDP ratio. These instruments are 2, 3 and 4-period lags of (Y/Y
*
)t and 2 and 3-
                                                          
5 We did experiment with the second lag in the dependent variable, since at this lag length there would be no 
clear interference with our intended interpretation of Ei1 and Ei2 and the variable could reflect omitted influences 
in the rest of the equation. At this lag length, the lagged dependent variable is insignificant, whether we 
instrument it or not. 
6 We added country-specific effects in Darby and Melitz (2008) but they indeed made no difference.  
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period lags of (D/Y)t-1. This economy of instruments proved valuable in estimation.  Our basic 
data sources are the OECD, the Economic Outlook and Social Expenditure databases, except 
for elec which comes from Armingeon et al. (2008).  
The twenty countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. Ours is an unbalanced panel for 1981-
2003 at best. We could have extended the study prior to 1981 and beyond 2003 had we not 
been keen on using a series for social spending inclusive of health expenditure.
7
 Our measures 
of Y
*
 and the output gap Y/Y
*
 rely upon the OECDs measure of potential output. But we 
have experimented with HP filtered data and the use of cubic spline functions to represent the 
long run secular trend in output or potential output instead.  
III. The automatic responses of social spending 
We begin discussion of the results with a simple confirmation of our starting message that 
automatic stabilization issues from many parts of social spending and not only unemployment 
compensation.  Consider equations (1) for the spending items Xi consisting of unemployment 
compensation, pensions, health spending, incapacity benefits and sick pay after dropping all 
explanatory variables reflecting strictly discretionary action, and also dropping the lagged 
output gap. Dropping the lagged output gap could well remove some automatic stabilization. 
Yet even if it does, the resulting estimates should still reflect automatic responses alone, since 
the responses of social spending to the current output gap clearly depend on the application of 
standing legal rules and we know of little evidence of short-term adjustment of these rules to 
the cycle. The resulting equations are: 
tjitji
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Table 1 shows the separate IV estimates of equations (2) for the spending items in question. 
                                                          
7 Specifically, the series we use for government spending on health benefits comes from the OECD Social 
Expenditure database. This database is less frequently published than the Economic Outlook one and we 
accessed the 2007 release that only provides data going up to 2003. 
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The table only shows the estimates of ȕi1 or the automatic responses to the cycle. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and '(Y/Y*) is instrumented in the 
manner previously described and repeated at the bottom of the table.  
Of course, these are not our preferred estimates of automatic stabilization, which only follow 
from equations (1) where discretionary fiscal policy enters simultaneously. However, the 
estimates of equations (2) are relevant in discussing the popular view that unemployment 
compensation is the only major category of social spending that responds automatically to the 
cycle since this view generally rests on estimates of automatic stabilization that exclude any 
discretionary policy. We must also emphasize that the conclusions in table 1 do not depend on 
our detailed estimation procedure. They would also follow if we used alternative measures of 
potential output depending on HP-filtered data or after approximating long term trend output 
via a spline function. They would similarly follow just as well if we introduced the lagged 
dependent variable or if we used 3SLS. Our previous work (Darby and Melitz (2008)) already 
cast much light on this point.  
As seen from table 1, based on equations (2), the contribution of social spending to automatic 
stabilization is .34 of a percentage-point relative to output. Consider instead the contribution 
of unemployment compensation by itself. We get a value of only .08. This last contribution 
thus makes up only about a quarter of the response of total social spending in the current 
period. Separate estimates for the other elements of social spending follow. They show a 
contribution of .12 of a percentage-point for pensions and one of around .06 of a percentage-
point for health spending. Given the confidence intervals, both figures are of a similar order 
of magnitude to the one for unemployment compensation. The contribution of incapacity 
benefits is also clear, though much smaller than any of the preceding.  Sick pay is the one 
category of social spending in Table 1 whose contribution to automatic stabilization does not 
emerge. The sum of the individual contributions in the table does not add up to the total for 
social spending partly because our disaggregated estimates omit subsidies to firms and other 
miscellanea.   
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IV. Automatic and discretionary fiscal policy combined 
We turn next to the central issue in this study of the joint estimation of automatic and 
discretionary fiscal policy. Let us begin with the case of symmetric responses to cyclical 
expansions and contractions, meaning equations (1). The relevant estimates are summarized 
in Table 2. There will be some important modifications once we allow for asymmetry, but 
these will strictly concern government consumption spending net of health. Table 2 offers 
estimates of five selected equations. The first one (Part A) relates to the net primary surplus 
and the next four pertain to our basic decomposition, which is between government receipts 
(Part B), social expenditures including health (Part C), government consumption exclusive of 
social health spending (Part D), and government investment (Part E). The equation for 
investment is extremely unstable. None of its coefficients are significantly different from zero 
apart from the .01 for the debt ratio; and we shall center the discussion on the other four 
equations. We shall also refer henceforth to government consumption exclusive of social 
health spending simply as government consumption.  
Let us focus first on the general test statistics. The performance of the instruments is 
satisfactory in all four equations. There is no problem of under-identification. Furthermore, 
the Hansen test of the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, is 
highly satisfactory. Interestingly enough, the tests of endogeneity reveal less need for 
instruments than the use we make of them. The tests unambiguously fail to require rejecting 
the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the contemporaneous output gap in all of the 
equations except social spending. In the case of the debt/GDP ratio too, these tests reject the 
null hypothesis of weak exogeneity in all the equations (with any ambiguity at all only in the 
consumption one).  
As regards the individual coefficients, let us consider first those reflecting the responses to the 
business cycle, 1iE and 2iE .  We shall also look carefully at the sum of these two coefficients, 
21 ii EE  , which concerns the total fiscal policy response to the cycle without any regard for 
the time profile or the distinction between automatic and discretionary action. This sum and 
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its standard error both appear in the table right below all the individual coefficients. In the 
case of the first four equations (Parts A through D), 21 ii EE  is highly significant except for 
revenues. In the case of the primary surplus, Part A, this sum is also extremely high, .73. 
However, in Part A neither 1iE  nor 2iE  is individually significant at conventional levels. This 
might be related to the result for revenue, in Part B, which shows opposite signs for the 
current and lagged responses. There is a stabilizing lagged response 2iE  offsetting a (less well 
defined) destabilizing current one 1iE . If accepted, this see-saw movement could be 
interpreted at least in two ways: a discretionary offset of an initial destabilizing automatic 
effect or a lagged automatic offset of an initial destabilizing automatic effect. We lean toward 
the latter interpretation. As mentioned earlier, some tax revenues can be expected to respond 
to the cycle with a one year lag based on existing tax legislation. This could cause revenues 
not to keep up with cyclical movements in output at first but to catch up a year later. On this 
interpretation, the results for revenues correspond to proportional taxation following a year 
(since 21 ii EE  is insignificant). We have studied direct taxes on households, direct taxes on 
firms, indirect taxes and social security revenues separately in order to see if this sheds any 
more light on the issue but it does not. The same basic time profile and aggregate outcome 
emerges for each separate category of revenues.  
The results for government social spending and government consumption are the central ones. 
In both cases, there is a well-defined response to the business cycle, which is entirely 
concentrated in the current period. We see little reason to question in either case that the 
response is entirely automatic. As mentioned before, in the case of social payments, the rules 
of eligibility do not alter in a cyclical manner. As for government consumption, there is a 
priori ground to expect an automatic counter-cyclical movement of the ratio to output and if 
discretionary fiscal policy either amplified or attenuated this movement, we would have 
expected the discretionary action not only to show up within the current year but also a year 
later. On these grounds, we shall interpret the results of Parts C and D of table 2 to signify 
strictly automatic stabilization, .35 coming from social spending and .24 more coming from 
consumption spending.   
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There is no evidence of automatic effects of current inflation based on the estimates of the 
primary surplus (Part A). This fits in well with the disaggregated results, showing significant 
offsetting effects of inflation on the revenue and spending sides of roughly equal size. Ratios 
of government revenues to output do not keep up with inflation but nor do ratios of taxes to 
output. 
With respect to debt, a stabilizing discretionary response of .022 shows up based on the 3-part 
decomposition of receipts, social spending and consumption (which would be higher if we 
admitted the single significant coefficient in the equation for investment), .015 of it coming 
from taxes and less, only .007, from social spending. This is below the significant value of 
.032 stabilization that we obtain in the single-equation estimate for the government primary 
surplus (which may incorporate the figure for investment). In the light of Mendoza and Ostry 
(2007) in particular, we also looked for non-linear effects of debt but found nothing.  
As regards elections, the tendency of an election year to lead to looser fiscal policy emerges 
plainly. A reduction in taxes is particularly clear. While any rise in government spending is 
not, the estimate for elec in the net primary surplus equation closely resembles the one we get 
by summing up the separate tax and spending coefficients and this value is also significant at 
the 95 percent confidence level.  We are therefore prone to accept the conclusion that a 
national election raises the primary deficit relative to GDP by approximately one-half of one 
percentage-point of output, that is, roughly the amount shown in the primary surplus equation.   
V. Asymmetric responses to the cycle  
Political considerations offer strong reasons to suspect there might be asymmetric responses 
to the business cycle, and more specifically, that fiscal discipline may relax substantially 
during expansions. We can allow for such responses by controlling separately for good 
times (when Y>Y
*
) and bad times when (Y<Y
*
). We shall do so by introducing three 
additional variables in equation (1). The first is a dummy variable Di+ which is equal 1 when 
Y>Y
*
 and equal 0 otherwise. This allows for a separate intercept in good times (Di + Di+) and 
in bad times (Di). We also add two interaction terms resulting by multiplying this dummy by 
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the output gap terms. Those generate '(Y/Y*)t+ and '(Y/Y*)t-1+ values, which are simply the 
values of  '(Y/Y*)t and '(Y/Y*)t-1 when  Y>Y* and equal 0 otherwise. The new test equation is 
hence: 
)3(7
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1
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An alternative approach to modeling asymmetric adjustment in some studies is to include 
separate output gap terms for good and bad times instead a term applying at all times and 
an additional term for in the output gap in good times only, as we do. The implied responses 
in good and bad times are identical in both cases, but our approach has the advantage that 
the estimates of ȕi3 and ȕi4, and the associated tests of significance, show directly whether 
there is a significant asymmetry while a separate test is necessary (for the significance of the 
difference between the coefficients in good and bad times) in the alternative approach. We 
also report an F-test of the joint restriction Įi+= Ei3 = Ei4 = 0 to test  the null hypothesis of 
symmetry against the alternative of asymmetry. 
 
In the estimates of equation (3), the results for the primary surplus are unacceptable based on 
the Hansen J statistic, whose probability value falls close to zero. The overidentifying 
conditions concerning the instruments can no longer be upheld. The results for government 
revenues, for their part, are similar to the previous ones. Allowing for asymmetry in this 
equation changes little. The results for social spending and consumption are the interesting 
ones. We present them in the first two columns of table 3 (A and B).   
In both columns (A) and (B) it is clear that the joint F-tests for Įi+ = ȕi3 = ȕi4 = 0 fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of symmetry.  Notwithstanding, it is helpful to look more closely at the 
implied responses in good times and in bad times, since this is our primary concern. As 
regards social spending, the automatic stabilization in good times ȕ1 + ȕ3 appears to be just 
as significant as in bad times (for ȕ1 alone). In addition, the combined automatic and 
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discretionary action  in good times ȕ1 + ȕ2 + ȕ3 + ȕ4 differs little from the combined 
automatic and discretionary action in bad times ȕ1 + ȕ2. Therefore the hypothesis of 
symmetry seems sound. However, in the case of government consumption, things are 
different. The high probability value of .38 associated with the combined automatic and 
discretionary action in good times would indicate insignificance, while the total effect in 
bad times is highly significant, with a probability value of .00. This clearly suggests an 
important asymmetry. The next two columns of Table 3 investigate this possibility further.  
Neither ȕ2 nor ȕ3 is significant in the case of government consumption in column B. 
Accordingly suppose we set both coefficients equal to zero. In column C, we set ȕ3 equal 
zero, while in column D we additionally drop ȕ2. Thus, column C simply imposes symmetry 
in the current response to the cycle while column D additionally admits no lagged response to 
the cycle in bad times. As can be seen, the estimates in these next 2 columns hardly differ at 
all from column B. To be quite specific, the fiscal response in the current period, or the 
automatic one, varies only between .23 and .26, regardless of good or bad times, in all 3 
columns, and the estimates for the total effect in good times are similarly uniform and 
insignificant. Furthermore direct testing of the joint restrictions that are imposed by the 
successive deletions of the two terms starting from the column B specification shows that the 
restrictions cannot be rejected, as indicated by the F test. The key difference is that the 
relevant hypothesis of zero asymmetry becomes less and less probable as we move from 
column B to column C to column D. The probability-value for the F test of the corresponding 
symmetry null F test goes down from .51 to .32 to .13 from B to C to D.  Symmetry becomes 
less plausible.  
Based on the estimates of the simplified specification reported in column D (and the previous 
two columns as well for that matter), there would seem to be a significant asymmetry in the 
implied behavior of government consumption: we cannot even reject the hypothesis that 
discretionary action totally offsets automatic stabilization. It also makes sense to attribute 
such reversal to discretionary action. The alternative of supposing an automatic tendency for 
government consumption to go into reverse and cancel its own earlier stabilizing movement 
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from one year to the next does not seem plausible. We are also not necessarily justified, 
however, in going to the extreme conclusion that the discretionary offset of the automatic 
response of government consumption is complete. Indeed, the standard confidence interval 
indicates that a wide range of estimates of the combined automatic and discretionary effect 
centered on the reported point estimate, cannot be rejected by the data. On this ground, the 
most likely degree of reversal of the automatic effect is about half. 
Based on the estimate for government consumption in column D of table 3, the earlier 
estimates of the other influences on government consumption (table 2, column D), or those 
for inflation, the debt ratio and the election years, are hardly affected. 
If we combine the estimates for government revenues and social spending in table 2 in the 
previous section with those for government consumption in table 3 in this section, we get the 
basic results of our study that we reported in the introduction.  There is .59 automatic 
stabilization, .35 coming from social spending and the other .24 from government 
consumption. The full .59 stabilization remains following the response of discretionary policy 
in a contraction, but arguably, only .35 (out of 1) remains after this response in an expansion.  
VI. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
The Maastricht Treaty came into effect in 1993 and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) did 
so late in 1997 or basically in 1998. Starting with Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002) 
and Galí and Perotti (2003), a sizeable literature analyzes the possible effect of both on the 
fiscal policy behavior of the EU members, the EMU members in particular. Galí and Perotti 
found little difference for the EMU members to speak of. More recent results are mixed 
(Balassone and Francese (2004), Forni and Momigliano (2005), Golinelli and Momigliano 
(2006), Balassone et al (2008), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008), Candelon et al (2010)). One 
conclusion seems to stand out if any: namely, that the effort to meet the entry conditions of 
the Maastricht Treaty led the candidate countries to rein in their budget deficits in 1993-1998, 
whereas following entry, the Treaty and the SGP ceased to exert any disciplinary pressure 
(see von Hagen et al (2000), IMF (2001), OECD (2005), Annett (2006), and Poplawski 
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Ribeiro (2009)). Even on this seeming point of agreement, there is no unanimity: Hercovitz 
and Strawczynski (2005) rally to Galí and Perottis view (at least for government spending if 
not the net primary surplus as a whole) in their statement: We found that government 
spending adjustment began in 1994, and that it can be characterized as an OECD phenomenon 
rather than as a phenomenon specific to countries participating in the Maastricht Treaty or the 
Stability and Growth Pact (p.822).   
In view of this literature, we made a strenuous effort to test for some differences in the 
behavior of EMU members following Maastricht. We constructed a dummy variable for EMU 
members that began with the Maastricht Treaty or candidacy for membership and covers 
1993-2003 and interacted the variable with current and lagged changes in output gaps and, in 
addition, we included the dummy separately. This mimics Galí and Perottis (2003) 
procedure, except that they use variables for before and after Maastricht whereas we use 
variables for the full-sample period and post-Maastricht (for the same reasons that we 
mentioned in connection with asymmetry: namely, to facilitate the interpretation of the 
statistical significance of the differences before and after Maastricht).
8
 In some cases, rather 
than defining the Maastricht variables for the EMU members for the entire study period, we 
defined them only for 1993-1998. This was meant to test whether Maastricht had an impact 
during candidacy but ceased to have any thereafter. In addition, we borrowed the suggestion 
of Forni and Momigliano (2005) (subsequently adopted by Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008) 
and Poplawski Ribeiro (2009)) of including a variable for deficit to GDP ratios in excess of 
the Maastricht limit of 3% in order to test whether trespassing the limit fostered fiscal 
discipline in subsequent periods. We then included the relevant variable with a one-year lag 
together with the previous Maastricht variables (alternatively, those for 1993-2003 and only 
for 1993-1998) or by itself alone. None of these experiments was successful.  
In no case could we find a difference in behavior before and after Maastricht, regardless 
                                                          
8Of course, there are other differences between our estimates and those of Galí and Perotti: they use the 
cyclically adjusted net primary balance (as a ratio of potential output) in levels as the dependent variable, 
employ a different dynamic structure and do not attempt to distinguish between current and lagged influences of 
the output gap.  
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whether we defined after-Maastricht as 1993-1999 only or the whole post-1993 period. In the 
process, though, we did find a significant difference between the behavior of the (eventual) 
EMU members and the rest for social spending, which we discuss in the appendix.  
Our fundamental conclusion is that, whatever may be true about Maastricht and its effects, it 
is not possible to find any influence of the Treaty following the introduction of first 
differences and instruments for the output gap, at least thus far or until longer time series 
become available. 
VII. The real time output gap 
Finally, we turn to results incorporating real time data. The relevant data are taken from the 
OECDs forecast of output gaps that have been published annually in Economic Outlook since 
1993. Our measure of the change in the real time output gap, ǻ(Yr/Yr*)t, is the value of the 
year  t+1 forecast of Y/Y
*
 published in the OECDs December year t edition of Economic 
Outloook, minus the year t forecast of Y/Y 
*
 published in the same edition. Since we use data 
in first differences, the time period available for estimation is restricted to 1994 through to 
2003, leaving 177 observations, approximately half as many as before. This drop in the span 
of data is unfortunate, not least because it means that we are left trying to discriminate 
between automatic and discretionary policy responses to the cycle in a period that 
encompasses most of the Great Moderation or a period of low cyclical movement. We can 
immediately infer that this will make the exercise more difficult.  In order to draw any 
inference, it is necessary first to reproduce the estimates in table 2, and those for government 
consumption in table 3, for this reduced time span, for comparison. The effort to replicate the 
earlier tests proves unsuccessful in the case of the asymmetric behavior of government 
consumption in table 3. The conditions of under- and over-identification which relate to the 
adequacy of the instruments are not sufficiently satisfied (the probability value of the 
Kleibergen-Paap test statistic rises too much and that of the Hansen J statistics drops too low). 
The revised estimates are uninformative. This should not be surprising. A loss of power is 
bound to follow from the shorter sample, even apart from the cyclical calm in the part of the 
sample that remains. Forging ahead with real time data does not help. We therefore center our 
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attention on table 2 concerning symmetry in all of the equations.  
Estimates of the table 2 specification over the shorter 1994-2003 sample are set out in the 
leftmost columns of each section of table 4 (in this case we ignore the investment equation, 
which makes no difference for the subsequent comparisons). We shall alter the usual order of 
discussion by beginning with social spending and consumption. As regards social spending, 
the results correspond closely to the earlier ones in table 2. For government consumption, 
matters are more complicated. The combined current and lagged response is similar in size to 
the earlier one in the corresponding equation in table 2 and strongly significant, as it was 
before. However, whilst in table 2 the entire impact was contemporaneous (automatic), in the 
shorter sample the point estimates for the current and lagged effects are similar. Nonetheless 
the considerable drop in the probability value for the Hansen J statistic conditions to .07 raises 
doubt about the over-identifying restrictions and the validity of these estimates. On the other 
hand and to complicate matters further, the case for instrumenting the output gaps becomes 
particularly fragile based on the endogeneity test. Therefore, we experimented with 
instrumenting only the debt ratio. In this case, none of the same difficulties arise. The results 
for the decomposition between the current and lagged responses are similar to the previous 
ones in table 2 and those for the aggregate of both responses continue to resemble the 
common ones in tables 2 and 4. Switching to the new consumption equation therefore seems 
unimportant. It also makes little difference for the subsequent comparison with the real time 
results. In the end, we stick to the consumption equation in the table.   
In the case of government revenues, shown in section (B) of table 4, it becomes possible to 
accept a positive contribution to stabilization at the 90% confidence level for the shorter 
sample. This may explain why the estimate of the total response of the primary surplus, 
section (A), is now higher than before at 1.08. However, the impact of the cycle on the 
primary surplus remains as difficult to decompose between a current and lagged response as it 
was before. As for the other influences on government fiscal behavior, all in all, the only 
notable difference is that the significance of the election year disappears.  
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In the second set of results in Table 4, all four parts, we show what happens when we 
substitute the real time value of the output gap (in first differences), ǻ(Yr/Yr*)t, for the lagged 
final value of the output gap (in first differences), ǻ(Y/Y*)t-1, to capture the discretionary 
response of fiscal policy to the cycle. Our measure of ǻ(Yr/Yr*)t is the value of the year t+1 
forecast of Y/Y
*
 published in the OECDs December year t edition of Economic Outloook, 
minus year t forecast published in the same edition.  We do not instrument ǻ(Yr/Yr*)t since 
government primary surpluses during a year cannot affect the real time value of the gap at the 
beginning of the year.  The equation is: 
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(4) 
There is remarkably little difference. Some improvement occurs in relation to our estimate on 
the left hand column in the case of the government consumption equation, where a stabilizing 
response to the gap emerges in the current period. On the other hand, the government revenue 
equation is more challenging: discretionary policy seems partly to offset a stabilizing 
automatic response to the cycle (at the 90% confidence level). This result for revenues may 
explain why the total response to the cycle, based on real time, is lower in the primary surplus 
equation than in our specification, on the left hand side. However, the main impression from 
the results of table 4 is that the use of real time data to capture discretionary fiscal policy 
responses to the cycle leads to no fundamental reassessment. At least in the case of symmetry, 
which is the only one that we can usefully study, discretionary fiscal policy responses to the 
cycle are about as small and subordinate relative to automatic stabilization with real time data 
as with final data.  
As an alternative to the previous approach, we also took a nested approach to the question 
whether real time data adds anything to our basic specification and added an extra term for 
the difference between the real time output gap and the lagged output gap to the final data 
specifications in Table 4. Doing so also has a negligible impact on the parameter estimates 
and test statistics. 
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However, our verdict does not agree with the earlier literature introducing real time data in 
analyzing fiscal policy, where we encounter frequent suggestions that fiscal authorities try to 
move in a stabilizing direction on the basis of real time data. In our view, though, the conflict 
is smaller than it appears. It is plain only in the case of two studies: Kalckreuth and Wolff 
(2007) and Bernoth et al. (2008). 
In their lead-off article on fiscal policy based on real time data, Forni and Momigliano (2004) 
only support the stabilizing movement of discretionary fiscal policy for contractions, not 
expansions. Subsequent support of this stabilizing movement by Cimadomo (2007) and 
Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) strictly concerns intentions rather than outcomes. Both 
papers argue for stabilizing fiscal policy based on predicted values of primary government net 
surpluses. Indeed, in the case of Cimadomo, the actual movement in the primary government 
surpluses is even perverse: the surpluses move in the opposite direction to the intended. In the 
case of Golinelli and Momigliano, things are not as bad: the authorities merely fail to obtain 
the movement they desire in primary surpluses.
9
 Both papers effectively therefore contradict 
Forni and Momiglianos (2004) positive assessment of stabilizing discretionary policy 
outcomes in contractions. Over and above this, all three studies and the rest concerning real 
time responses of fiscal authorities to the cycle, with the exception of Kalckreuth and Wolff 
(2007) and Bernoth et al. (2008), use official data for cyclically adjusted primary government 
surpluses (whether final or in real time) as the dependent variable. Yet we have shown that 
this data does not properly correct for the cycle. The studies also use real time data for the 
output gap as the sole representation of the gap on the right hand sides. Yet the real time data 
for the output gap, however distinct it may be from the final data, is still positively correlated 
with it (anywhere from .40 to .62 in our sample). Thus, even so far as the results of these 
studies intersect ours, the influence of the real time variable could well partly reflect 
                                                          
9 Both results are severely damning for discretionary fiscal policy responses to the cycle, especially those of 
Cimadomo, as he recognizes. It would be bad enough if the fiscal authorities did not succeed in moving the net 
primary surplus instrument in the intended direction. But if they even tend to move the surplus in the opposite 
way, they should clearly desist from any short run action. Indeed, even if the fiscal authorities control their 
instrument but merely significantly misinterpret the output gap in real time, questions already arise about 
discretionary fiscal policy in the short run. See, for example, Jonung and Larch (2006). We do not deal with any 
of these issues.  
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automatic rather than discretionary fiscal policy. Still another difference, of course, is that 
these studies adopt a single-equation approach to fiscal behavior.  
While the conflict between our results and the rest of the literature on real time is not clear in 
the majority of cases, it is so for Kalckreuth and Wolff (2007) and Bernoth et al. (2008).  
Kalckreuth and Wolff (2007) obtain discretionary responses of fiscal policy to real time errors 
in the data about output (not the output gap) in the U.S.
10
 On their part, Bernoth et al. (2008) 
report support for the stabilizing movement of fiscal policy in response to real time errors 
about the output gap in a sample covering 14 European countries and most of our time span in 
Table 4. For the moment, our only explanation for these differences is that Kalckreuth and 
Wolff deal strictly with the U.S. and rely heavily on a different estimation method (SVAR) 
whereas Bernoth et al. not only employ a different estimation method (Blundell-Bond GMM), 
but a different specification (and their country/year sample also does not coincide with ours).  
VIII. Conclusion 
We have argued that official calculations of automatic stabilizers are seriously flawed. This 
puts doubt on many estimates of discretionary fiscal policy responses to the cycle. One 
approach is to avoid the official estimates but still retain the conventional two-step approach 
to discretionary fiscal policy that consists of constructing cyclically adjusted data on the basis 
of various filters for the cyclical adjustment in a first step. However, we believe that a better 
solution is to estimate automatic and discretionary fiscal policy jointly from the start. One 
consequence of our approach is to put into question any single-equation treatment of fiscal 
policy since the revenues and spending sides respond widely differently to the cycle and since 
the automatic responses of spending to the cycle depend heavily on most social spending. 
This leads to a minimal three-part decomposition of the budget balance between revenues, 
social spending, and spending on goods and services. However, we prefer a four-part 
decomposition since the behavior of capital spending is sufficiently different. There is also an 
argument for combining social spending on health with other social spending rather than 
                                                          
10 They also decompose government budget balances in two parts, net taxes (revenues minus transfer payments) 
and government spending on goods and services, as did Blanchard and Perotti (2002), in the study that serves 
them as a guide. 
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government consumption, where is it is usually found. Social spending on health responds 
automatically to the cycle much like other social spending, consisting of transfer payments, 
and not like government consumption. It is also a large and increasingly significant spending 
item (around 13 percent of total government spending in the recent part of our OECD 
sample). Unfortunately, though, OECD data series for social health spending (which strictly 
relates to spending in response to claims by insured individuals and not any wage or capital 
expenditures in a nationalized health sector, as explained in note 1) is only available from 
1980 forward and published with far greater delays than the rest of the series in our study. 
Therefore our insistence on reclassifying social health spending cuts down our estimation 
period both at the beginning and the end.   
Our headline results are .59 automatic stabilization in percentage-points of primary surplus 
balances.
11
 In addition, discretionary policy cancels part of automatic stabilization through 
destabilizing government consumption behavior (net of health) in expansions, leaving only 
perhaps as little as .35 stabilization standing. On the other hand, the full influence of 
automatic stabilization remains standing with no subsequent discretionary policy action in 
contractions. These asymmetric results concerning government consumption fit in well with 
many earlier theoretical and empirical findings. We also corroborate many earlier reports of 
stabilizing responses of government budget balances to government debt and destabilizing 
responses to national election dates, especially on the tax side. On the other hand, we fail to 
confirm the occasional successes of earlier researchers in uncovering effects of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the SGP on fiscal policy behavior in the eurozone and uncovering major 
differences in responses of discretionary fiscal policy based on real time series. The reason 
could lie in the greater demands that we make on the data via the use of first differences. The 
shortness of our time series could also be a factor. Perhaps our use of instruments for the 
separate influences of the output gap has something to do with the differences as well, 
especially in light of the two previous factors. For these reasons, we only claim to be unable 
                                                          
11 The profiles of the cyclically adjusted budget balances for the individual countries based on our estimates are 
available upon request. They show far fewer long cyclical swings and many more reversals than the official 
series of the OECD though the two series are still positively correlated. We are grateful to David Cobham for 
suggesting that we examine this issue.   
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to confirm earlier conclusions about Maastricht influences or real time, not to refute them.  
Let us note, in closing, that the recent upsurge of interest in fiscal policy following the 2007-
2009 financial crisis has increased the significance of a proper assessment of fiscal policy, a 
large subject, to which we contribute. Without such assessment, efforts to detect the impact of 
discretionary fiscal policy action on the economy cannot go far. 
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APPENDIX 
Are EMU countries different?  Social and health spending  
In the effort to uncover some difference in the behavior of (eventual) EMU members before 
and after Maastricht, we introduced general controls for a difference in the behavior of the 
EMU members from the rest for the period as a whole. While these controls made no 
difference otherwise, they revealed a significant difference in behavior in the EMU for social 
spending. The current response of social spending to the output gap in the EMU countries is 
substantially more stabilizing than in the rest of the OECD, while the lagged response to the 
gap in the EMU is somewhat destabilizing whereas outside the EMU it is not. In fact, there is 
no significant lagged response to the gap at all outside EMU. Because of the destabilizing 
lagged response in EMU, the combined current and lagged responses are only moderately 
more stabilizing there than elsewhere.  The result is in table A1 (column ii), where the 
estimating equation is at the top.  
As can be seen, for the current period, we get .55 stabilization for the EMU members (E1+E3) 
and .24 (E1) for the rest. Once the lagged effects come into view, the sum stabilizing response 
for the EMU members is .42 (E1+E2+E3+E4) while that for the rest is .34 (E1+E2): thus the 
difference narrows. All of these figures are estimated with fair accuracy. The figures are also 
fairly consistent with the earlier estimate of .35 stabilization for the OECD members as a 
group in the current period and .36 when the lagged effect is added in table 2 (as is shown 
once again in table A1).  It is easy to accept the hypothesis of a higher immediate impact of 
the output gap on social spending in the EMU than the rest of the OECD. Social spending 
programs in the EMU are known to be larger than elsewhere. On this ground, social spending 
could yield more automatic stabilization there as well. On the other hand, the narrowing of the 
difference between EMU and non-EMU responses to the cycle once the lagged effects are 
included is rather uncomfortable.  The easiest interpretation, in our reasoning, would be some 
tendency for the EMU sub-group to engage in destabilizing discretionary social spending in 
recessions and expansions alike. However, this is an unfamiliar result that would need further 
support. 
TABLE 1  AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION 
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20countries,1980 ?2003,368obs IV
Socialspending  ?0.336(.053)[.00]
Unemploymentcompensation  ?0.079(.018)[.00]
Pensions   ?0.118(.023)[.00]
Health   ?0.057(.017)[.00]
Incapacity   ?0.014(.008)[.06]
SickPay   ?0.001(.007)[.92]
 
 
Notes:Theequationsincludeafullsetoftimedummies.Theinstrumentsusedforthechangeintheoutputgaparelags2through4periodlagsof(Y/Y*)t.
Thestandarderrorsreportedin(.)arerobusttoheteroscedasticityandautocorrelationwhilep ?valuesaregivenin[.].
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TABLE 2: AUTOMATIC AND DISCRETIONARY RESPONSES TO THE CYCLE 
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IVEstimates
20countries,1982 ?2003,350obs 
(A)
PrimarySurplus
(B)
Government
Receipts
(C)
GovernmentSocial
Spending
(D)
Gov.Consumption
Spending
(E)
Gov.Investment
Spending
           ǻ(Y/Y*)t 0.301(.281)[.29]   ?0.252(.178)[.16]   ?0.353(.073)[.00]   ?0.242(.069)[.00] 0.041(.085)[.63]
           ǻ(Y/Y*)t-1 0.431(.271)[.11] 0.354(.161)[.03]   ?0.009(.067)[.90] 0.029(.069)[.67]   ?0.097(.091)[.28]
           ǻ ʌt 0.010(.009)[.92]   ?0.114(.040)[.01]   ?0.067(.026)[.02]   ?0.081(.028)[.00] 0.024(.038)[.52]
           (D/Y)t-1 0.032(.009)[.00] 0.015(.005)[.01]   ?0.007(.003)[.02]   ?0.003(.003)[.21]   ?0.008(.003)[.02]
           Elec  ?0.480(.195)[.02]   ?0.283(.122)[.02] 0.084(.061)[.17] 0.072(.057)[.21] 0.041(.088)[.64]
Combinedautomaticand
discretionaryresponse  (E1+E2) 
0.733(.195)[.00] 0.101(.106)[.34]   ?0.361(.070)[.00]   ?0.213(.054)[.00]   ?0.057(.069)[.61]
EndogeneityTests F2(1):  (Y/Y*)t 0.055[.82] 0.519[.47] 2.564[.11] 0.996[.32] 0.006[.94]
                                          (D/Y)t-1 21.01[.00] 7.869[.01] 4.571[.03] 2.092[.15] 5.798[.02]
Jointsignif.ofĮit F(22,321): 1.50[.07] 2.42[.00] 1.42[.10] 2.38[.00] 1.25[.20]
Underidentificationtest:
Kleibergen ?PaaprKLMtest

16.13[.00]

16.13[.00]

16.13[.00]

16.13[.00]

16.13[.00]
OveridentificationRestrictions:
HansenJ ?test 0.169[.92] 0.448[.80] 0.183[.91] 1.265[.53] 0.109[.95]
Notes:Theequationsincludeafullsetoftimedummies.Instrumentsusedarelags2 ?4oftheoutputgapandlags2 ?3ofthechangeinthedebttoGDPratio.
Thestandarderrorsreportedin(.)arerobusttoheteroscedasticityandautocorrelationwhileP ?valuesaregivenin[.].
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TABLE 3: ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES TO THE CYCLE 
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 Gov.SocialSpending GovernmentConsumption
IV,350obs. (A) (B) (C) (D)
           ǻ(Y/Y*)t 0.310(.081)[.00]   ?0.263(.069)[.00]   ?0.259(.070)[.00]   ?0.238(.058)[.00]
           ǻ(Y/Y*)t-1  ?0.013(.067)[.84] 0.036(.068)[.59] 0.033(.068)[.63]  ? ? ?
           ǻ(Y/Y*)+t  ?0.182(.170)[.29] 0.021(.157)[.13]  ? ? ?  ? ? ?
           ǻ(Y/Y*)+t-1 0.124(.190)[.51] 0.010(.152)[.66] 0.114(.129)[.38] 0.120(.126)[.34]
           ǻ ʌt  ?0.077(.023)[.00]   ?0.088(.025)[.00]   ?0.088(.025)[.00]   ?0.086(.025)[.00]
            (D/Y)t-1  ?0.003(.003)[.25]   ?0.001(.002)[.55]   ?0.001(.002)[.55]   ?0.001(.002)[.54]
           Elec 0.077(.061)[.20] 0.078(.057)[.17] 0.077(.055)[.17] 0.078(.055)[.16]
Automaticpolicyinbadtimes:E1  ?0.310(.081)[.00]   ?0.263(.069)[.00]   ?0.259(.070)[.00]   ?0.238(.058)[.00]
Automaticpolicyingoodtimes:E1+E3  ?0.492(.159)[.00]   ?0.242(.162)[.14]   ?0.259(.070)[.00]   ?0.238(.058)[.00]
Combinedautomatic&discretionarypolicy
inbadtimes:E1+E2

 ?0.324(.089)[.00]

 ?0.226(.064)[.00]

 ?0.226(.064)[.00]

 ?0.238(.058)[.00]
ingoodtimes:E1+E2+E3+E4  ?0.381(.124)[.00]   ?0.105(.120)[.38]   ?0.112(.095)[.24]   ?0.118(.097)[.22]
EndogeneityTests F2(1):                   (Y/Y*)t 
 (Y/Y
*
)
+
t 
(D/Y)t-1 
1.002[.32]
0.761[.38]
0.519[.47]
0.663[.42]
0.152[.70]
0.550[.46]
 
Jointsignif.ofĮit : F(22,318)=1.34[.14] F(22,318)=1.93[.01] F(22,319)=1.96[.01] F(20,320)=2.03[.00]
Kleibergen ?PaaprKLMStatistic 12.09[.02] 12.09[.02] 16.99[.00] 17.28[.01]
HansenJstatistic 3.757[.29] 3.970[.26] 4.098[.39] 4.687[.46]
Testsofjointrestrictions:

H0:D+=E3=E4=0,
F(3,318)=0.59[.62]
H0:D+=E3=E4=0,
F(3,318)=0.76[.51]
H0:D+=E4=0,
F(2,319)=1.14[.32]
H0:D+=E4=0,
F(2,320)=2.09[.13]
Testofreductioncolumn(B)to(D):  H0:E2=E3=0,
F(2,318)=0.14[.87]
 
Notes:seeTable2.
TABLE 4:  AUTOMATIC AND DISCRETIONARY RESPONSES - INTRODUCING REAL TIME DATA 
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IV,177obs. (A)PrimarySurplus (B)GovernmentReceipts (C)GovernmentSocialSpending (D)GovernmentConsumption
1994 ?2003 FinalData RealTimeData

FinalData RealTimeData

FinalData RealTimeData FinalData RealTimeData
ǻ(Y/Y*)t 0.568(.354)[.11] 1.081(.271)[.00] 0.023(.296)[.94] 0.297(.185)[.11]   ?0.451(.101)[.00]   ?0.477(.113)[.00]   ?0.120(.087)[.17]   ?0.217(.083)[.01]
ǻ(Y/Y*)t-1 0.512(.288)[.08]  0.318(.235)[.18]    ?0.014(.125)[.11]    ?0.107(.097)[.27] 
ǻ(Yr/Yr*)t    ?0.317(.113)[.01]    ?0.119(.070)[.09]  0.034(.061)[.57]  0.048(.042)[.26]
ǻʌt  ?0.002(.131)[.99]   ?0.016(.123)[.90]   ?0.125(.066)[.06]   ?0.132(.059)[.03]   ?0.079(.033)[.02]   ?0.077(.034)[.03]   ?0.123(.024)[.00]   ?0.120(.022)[.00]
(D/Y)t-1 0.024(.012)[.04] 0.019(.011)[.08] 0.016(.008)[.03] 0.012(.006)[.06]   ?0.004(.005)[.36]   ?0.004(.004)[.31]   ?0.001(.034)[.73]   ?0.002(.003)[.40]
Elec  ?0.277(.273)[.31]   ?0.534(.235)[.02]   ?0.041(.219)[.85]   ?0.188(.159)[.24] 0.129(.107)[.23]   ?0.140(.097)[.15]   ?0.001(.079)[.99] 0.050(.064)[.78]
Combinedresponse      
                         ȕ1+ ȕ2 1.080(.294)[.00] 0.764(.244)[.00] 0.341(.195)[.08] 0.178(.171)[.30]   ?0.495(.072)[.00]   ?0.443(.083)[.00]   ?0.326(.064)[.00]   ?0.169(.067)[.01]
Endog.tests:     ǻ(Y/Y*)t  
                        (D/Y)t-1    
1.584[.21]
6.827[.01]
7.854[.01]
4.371[.04]
0.277[.60]
4.703[.03]
1.518[.22]
2.980[.08]
6.193[.01]
0.876[.35]
4.131[.04]
1.502[.22]
0.001[.98]
0.183[.67]
0.627[.10]
0.008[.93]
JointsignificanceofĮit  
F(9,162)
3.12[.00] 3.92[.00] 3.41[.00] 3.67[.00] 1.14[.33] 1.33[.22] 3.38[.00] 3.50[.00]
Kleibergen ?PaapLM 7.315[.06] 7.624[.11] 7.315[.06] 7.624[.11] 7.315[.06] 7.624[.11] 7.315[.06] 7.624[.11]
HansenJ ?test 0.668[.71] 2.420[.49] 0.495[.78] 3.317[.35] 2.898[.25] 3.006[.39] 5.323[.07] 6.266[.10]
Notes:SeeTable2.Realtimeoutputgapsarenotinstrumented.
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TABLE A1: ARE EMU COUNTRIES DIFFERENT?  – SOCIAL SPENDING 
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Notes:SeeTable2. 
IVestimates
20countries,1982 ?2003,n=350
GovernmentSocial
Spending
(i)
(AsTable2)

GovernmentSocial
Spending
(ii)
               ǻ(Y/Y*)t  ?0.353(.073)[.00]   ?0.243(.073)[.00]
               ǻ(Y/Y*)t-1  ?0.009(.067)[.90]   ?0.097(.075)[.20]
               ǻ(Y/Y*)t..DEMU  ? ?  ?0.302(.105)[.00]
               ǻ(Y/Y*)t-1.DEMU  ? ? 0.227(.107)[.04]
               ǻ ʌt  ?0.067(.026)[.02]   ?0.080(.025)[.00]
                (D/Y)t-1  ?0.007(.003)[.01]   ?0.007(.004)[.06]
               Elec 0.084(.061)[.17] 0.037(.064)[.56]
Combinedresponseallcountries                   ȕ1 + ȕ2 
CombinedresponsenonEMUcountries       ȕ1 + ȕ2 
ContemporaneousresponseEMUcountries  ȕ1 + ȕ3 
CombinedresponseEMUcountries   ȕ1 + ȕ2+ ȕ3 + ȕ4 
 ?0.361(.070)[.00]
 ? ?
 ? ?
 ? ?
 ? ?
 ?0.341(.074)[.00]
 ?0.546(.098)[.00]
 ?0.416(.086)[.00]
Jointsignificanceof DEMU terms               Ȗ, ȕ3 and ȕ4  ? ? F(3,318)=2.81[.04]
Jointsignificanceofɲit F(22,321)=1.42[.10] F(22,318)=1.53[.04]
Underidentificationtest:Kleibergen ?PaapLMtest 16.13[.00] 17.36[.00]
OveridentificationRestrictions:HansenJ ?test 0.183[.91] 0.704[.87]
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